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Abstract 
The phenomenon of suicide is one of the primary concerns for mental health 
professions. The health care literature is dominated by discussions that focus 
variously on local and national suicide prevention policies, on the assessment of those 
individuals judged to be at risk of committing suicide as well as the appropriateness 
and efficacy of interventions for those who express suicidal ideation and display 
suicidal behaviours. What appear less frequently in the literature, however, are critical 
analyses of the concept of suicide and, in particular, critical reflections on the manner 
in which the concept of suicide has been, and continues to be, understood or ‘framed’. 
In an attempt to respond to this apparent omission, this paper will suggest that the 
work of Albert Camus, and his philosophical work The Myth of Sisyphus in particular, 
can be understood as providing a significant reconceptualization and reframing of 
suicide. In doing so, it will be suggested that Camus’s work not only challenges how 
the concept of suicide has traditionally been situated within the context of mental 
illness, but can also be understood as challenging the efficacy of the interventions that 
have been associated with an understanding of suicide within that context. 
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Accessible summary 
 
• The twentieth century intellectual Albert Camus, and specifically his 
philosophical essay The Myth of Sisyphus, can be understood as providing a 
significant perspective on suicide.         
• In particular, Camus situates the phenomena of suicide within the context of 
the uniquely human endeavour to make sense of the struggles and sorrows of 
life.  
• In doing so, his work challenges both the manner in which suicide has been 
understood within the context of mental illness, and the custodial and 
defensive practices that are associated with such an understanding of suicide.   
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Introduction 
Albert Camus, the French-Algerian playwright, novelist and writer of philosophical 
essays, is generally acknowledged as being one of the most important cultural and 
intellectual figures of the twentieth century (see, e.g. Bronner 1999, Hughes 2007, 
Zaretsky 2013). While he explicitly sets himself against ‘existentialist philosophies’ 
(Camus 2000a, p. 35), Camus is commonly understood as belonging to the 
existentialist tradition of Continental philosophy (West 2010, pp. 169-170), and of 
having explored a variety of existentialist themes in his literary and philosophical 
works (see, e.g. 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2000d, 2000e) that retain a significance for 
contemporary men and women. Indeed, in highlighting the enduring significance of 
Camus’s work and the themes that he explored within that work, Zaretsky (2010) has 
suggested that:  ‘If there is one conviction that scholars and nonscholars share, it is 
that Camus is still an indispensable companion in our intellectual and ethical lives. He 
appears to us, in a way that few other writers do, as someone who wrote for his life 
and for our lives as well’ (p. 2). This paper will propose that Camus’s work can also 
be understood as possessing an enduring, contemporary significance for the 
theoretical concerns and therapeutic practices of the mental health profession and that 
his work can be employed to formulate a significant reconceptualization of the 
phenomenon of suicide. In doing so, the paper will focus exclusively on his 
philosophical essay The Myth of Sisyphus (in so far as it is here that he conducts his 
most systematic discussion of suicide) to suggest that Camus provides an existentialist 
reconceptualization of suicide. In particular, it will be suggested that he not only 
challenges the manner in which suicide has traditionally been understood or ‘framed’ 
within the context of mental illness, but also challenges the appropriateness of the 
interventions that have been associated with understanding suicide within that context.  
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Suicide and mental illness 
The phenomenon of suicide is one of the primary concerns for mental health 
professions. The health care literature is dominated by discussions that focus 
variously on local and national suicide prevention policies, on the assessment of those 
individuals judged to be at risk of committing suicide as well as the appropriateness 
and efficacy of interventions for those who express suicidal ideation and display 
suicidal behaviours (see, e.g. Hawton 2005, O’Connor et al. 2011, Cutcliffe & Santos 
2012). What appear less frequently in the literature, however, are critical analyses of 
the concept of suicide and, in particular, critical reflections on the manner in which 
the concept of suicide has been, and continues to be, framed. That is, the concept of 
suicide - as with all concepts (Deleuze & Guattari 2003, pp. 5-8) - is not to be 
understood as an ahistorical or unproblematic category. Rather, the concept of suicide 
is to be understood as possessing a rich and complex history, of having been subject 
to a variety of historical ‘forces’ and of being shaped or framed in response to a 
variety of socio-political concerns and considerations (see, e.g. Williams 1997, pp. 1-
18, O’Connor & Sheehy 2000, pp. 1-9, Reeves 2013, pp. 15-20). The historical and 
socio-political context out of which the concept of suicide has emerged is therefore to 
be understood as a significant factor in influencing how practitioners think about 
suicide. Indeed, the context from which the concept of suicide has emerged can not 
only be understood as exerting an enduring influence on how practitioners think about 
suicide, but also as influencing professional debate and discussion about what 
interventions and strategies ought to be guiding contemporary practice. As Cutcliffe 
and Santos (2012) suggest, “how a concept or issue is ‘framed’ has a huge impact (if 
not dominant influence) on how that concept is used, discussed and debated in any 
associated discourse – including a practice discourse” (p. 245).  
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 It has been suggested, at least since the emergence of modern psychiatry as a 
discipline, that one of the most common and enduring conceptual understandings of 
suicide has been to frame it within the context of ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental disorder’ 
(Heyd & Bloch 2000, p. 447, Cutcliffe & Santos 2012, p. 246). While there exist a 
number of explanatory models as to why suicide ought to be understood within this 
context, the most common explanation proposes that the symptoms of mental illness - 
in particular, ‘cognitive distortions’, ‘irrationality’ and ‘impulsivity’ - are ‘an 
important causal factor’ in the person committing suicide and that, without these 
symptoms being present, the person would not have killed themselves (Mishara & 
Chagnon 2011, p. 612). There exists a substantial body of literature that proposes that 
an understanding of suicide within the context of mental illness is appropriate - with 
suicidal behaviour being associated with affective disorders, substance-use related 
disorders, personality disorders and schizophrenia (see, e.g. Cavanagh et al. 2003, 
Bertolote et al. 2004, Hawton & van Heeringen 2009, Lönnqvist 2009). However, 
there also exists a body of literature that contradicts and challenges, on various 
methodological and conceptual grounds, the automatic association of suicide with 
mental illness (see, e.g. Shneidman 1996, Tanney 2000, Szasz 2002, van Praag 2004). 
For example, in highlighting a contentious form of reasoning that entails a conflation 
of suicide with mental illness, Pilgrim (2010) proposes that the error lies in 
retrospectively imputing mental disorder and irrationality in all cases where a person 
has considered, attempted or committed suicide. As he makes clear, “when and if a 
person commits suicide, then it is easy to argue that the ‘balance of their mind’ was 
faulty at the fatal moment or that they had a prior mental disorder, which made them 
particularly prone to self-sacrifice” (Pilgrim 2010, p. 176).  
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 It is important to note, however, that questioning the manner in which suicide 
is framed within the context of mental illness is not to be understood as proposing that 
the association of suicide with mental illness is invalid. It may be that suicide, some 
of the time, reflects cognitive distortions, irrationality and impulsivity (Pilgrim 2010, 
p. 176). Rather, what is being challenged is the automatic association and potential 
conflation of suicide with mental illness and, in particular, the suggestion that those 
who express suicidal ideation, attempt to commit suicide or succeed in committing 
suicide must, by that fact itself, have a mental illness (Cutcliffe & Santos 2012, p. 
246). Moreover, to the extent that suicide is understood within the context of mental 
illness then this has important implications for what interventions and strategies are 
considered to be appropriate for those individuals who are judged to be at risk. In so 
far as suicidal ideation and behaviour is understood as being symptomatic of a mental 
illness (and, in particular, as being a consequence of irrationality and impulsivity) 
then it has been suggested that the predominant intervention has traditionally been a 
pharmacological one supported by the ‘custodial and defensive practices’ of 
containment, seclusion, close observations and no-suicide contracts (Henden 2008, 
Cutcliffe & Santos 2012, Goldney 2011). Again, to challenge the manner in which 
suicide is framed within the context of mental illness is not to propose that such 
defensive practices have no clinical function or value. However, the efficacy of such 
interventions has repeatedly been called into question with it being suggested that, 
rather than actually seeking to address ‘the problem’, such interventions are more 
concerned with limiting damage resulting from the problem and do little or nothing to 
address the individual’s emotional and psychological needs (Cutcliffe & Barker 2002, 
McMyler & Pryjmachuk 2008, Cutcliffe & Stevenson 2008).     
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Camus and suicide 
It is within this context - the association and potential conflation of suicide with 
mental illness or disorder, and the therapeutic dominance of pharmacological and 
custodial interventions for those judged to be at risk - that Camus’s account of suicide 
can be understood. In order to do so, it is productive to begin by noting that Camus 
(2000a) does not present his discussion of suicide in The Myth of Sisyphus by seeking 
to identify specific causal factors or events that would lead an individual to 
contemplate or commit suicide. As he makes clear: ‘There are many causes for a 
suicide and generally the most obvious ones were not the most powerful’ (Camus 
2000a, p. 12). Such an attempt to retrospectively determine, from a multiplicity of 
possible events, which specific events or factors led the individual to commit suicide 
is said to be ‘almost always unverifiable’ (Camus 2000a, p. 12). Instead, Camus 
(2000a) proposes that a more productive way to investigate and understand the 
phenomena of suicide is to ‘deduce’ what the act itself communicates or ‘implies’ (p. 
13). In doing so, he suggests that those who consider, attempt or commit suicide are 
making a declaration or, as it were, a ‘confession’ about life and their relation to it. In 
particular, the act of suicide “‘is confessing that life is too much for you or that you do 
not understand it. Let’s not go too far in such analogies, however, but return to 
everyday words. It is merely confessing that that ‘is not worth the trouble’” (Camus 
2000a, p. 13). Therefore, rather than seeking to understand suicide by attempting to 
determine which events are ‘an important causal factor’, Camus’s work suggests that 
the individual who has committed suicide has made a declarative judgement about the 
worth or the value of life, has undergone a ‘crisis’ in which the value of existence has 
been questioned and, in reaching the conclusion that it does not possess worth or 
value, has responded by committing suicide.     
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Is it possible, however, to say more about the process that would lead an 
individual to make such a declarative judgement about the value of life? Is it possible 
to further elucidate why an individual would reach the conclusion that life has no 
value and, in response to that conclusion, commit suicide? To address these 
interconnected questions, it is necessary to elucidate that which Camus (2000a) refers 
to simply as ‘the absurd’. Indeed, he proposes that the focus of his concern in The 
Myth of Sisyphus is precisely to examine the relation between suicide and the absurd 
and, in particular, to determine the degree to which suicide is to be understood as a 
solution to the absurd (Camus 2000a, pp. 13-14). In particular, Camus (2000a) 
proposes that the absurd is to be understood in terms of a contradictory or frustrated 
encounter between the profound human desire for life to have a meaning - for life to 
possess a ‘unity’, ‘great idea’ or ‘overarching, grand explanation’ that serves as a 
context within which the various struggles and sorrows of an individual’s life can 
make sense (p. 15) - and the realisation that there is no grand explanation or, if there 
is, it is beyond the achievement of human reason to discern it (p. 51). However, the 
absurd is not to be found, as it were, ‘in man’ and neither is it to be found ‘in the 
world’, but is instead to be understood as that which arises as a consequence of the 
‘encounter’, ‘confrontation’ and ‘disjunction’ between the individual and the world 
(Camus 2000a, pp. 32-34). In illustrating the manner in which the absurd is to be 
understood as arising out of a contradictory, disjunctive relation between an 
individual’s desire to discern life’s meaning and the apparent meaninglessness of life, 
Camus (2000a) makes it clear that the absurd ‘is that divorce between the mind that 
desires and the world that disappoints, my nostalgia for unity, this fragmented 
universe and the contradiction that binds them together’ (p. 50).  
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Suicide is therefore to be understood by Camus as a confession that life 
possesses no worth or value, and this judgement arises as a consequence of the absurd, 
contradictory encounter between the individual’s desire to make sense of the struggles 
and sorrows of life and the apparent lack of an overarching meaning that would 
enable them to do so. Not every individual, however, will respond to the apparent 
absurdity of existence by reaching the nihilistic conclusion that life possesses no value 
or worth. Indeed, driven by what is referred to as the ‘nostalgia for unity’ or ‘appetite 
for the absolute’ that is said to reflect ‘the essential impulse for the human drama’ 
(Camus 2000a, p. 23), many will adopt a great idea or grand narrative that satisfies the 
desire for life to possess a meaning. As Camus (2000a) proposes, there are a variety 
of grand narratives - religious, philosophical and political (p. 35, p. 189) - that purport 
to disclose the supra-historical, transcendent and overarching explanation of the world 
and provide the individual with a context in which to situate the meaning of their own 
life. However, in accordance with the repeated suggestion that modernity is 
characterized by a growing incredulity towards such overarching explanations or 
grand, metanarratives (see, e.g. Nietzsche 1974, p. 279, Lyotard 1997, p. xxiv, 
Vattimo 1999, p. 28, Deleuze & Guattari 2000, p. 308, Frankl 2004, p. 111, Roberts 
2007, p. 277), Camus’s (2000a) work suggests that for many the acceptance of these 
ostensible explanations will be unacceptable in so far as they necessitate ‘the leap’ to 
believe, or maintain faith, in their validity (pp. 42-3). Rather than addressing the 
absurd, rather than resolving the confrontation between the human desire to discern 
life’s meaning and the apparent meaninglessness of life, Camus (2000a) makes it 
clear that the leap of faith involved in accepting such supra-historical, overarching 
explanations of the world is a way to ‘escape’ the absurd that, for some individuals, 
demands an unacceptable ‘sacrifice of the intellect’ (p. 40).  
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Camus, suicide and mental illness 
In presenting suicide as a declarative judgement about the value of life that arises as a 
response to the absurd, Camus’s work can be understood as providing a profound 
challenge to the framing of suicide within the context of mental illness. Against the 
automatic association and potential conflation of suicide with mental illness, Camus 
radically reconceptualizes suicide such that it is understood as a terminal point in the 
attempt to address a profound existential problem; namely, the uniquely human and 
profoundly challenging endeavour to make sense of the struggles and sorrows of life. 
In particular, Camus’s work suggests that suicide is to be understood as the outcome 
of a contradictory encounter between an individual’s attempt to make sense of life and 
the inability to discern an overarching explanation that would enable them to do so. In 
contrast to an understanding of suicide within the context of mental illness and 
irrationality, Camus’s work suggests that the suicidal individual has been unable to 
take the ‘non-rational’ or ‘irrational’ leap of faith involved in accepting the validity of 
an explanation of the world provided by a grand religious, philosophical or political 
idea. That is, in seeking to make sense of life and its various challenges, the individual 
has attempted to do so through the employment of their intellect or reason and - in 
concluding that existence is absurd, in concluding that life possesses no meaning or, if 
it does, it is beyond the achievement of the individual’s reason to discern it - has 
pursued that reason to its limits. In characterising this uncompromising adherence to 
reason, Camus (2000a) proposes that: ‘My reasoning wants to be faithful to the 
evidence that aroused it…There can be no question of masking the evidence, of 
suppressing the absurd…Any other position implies for the absurd mind deceit and 
the mind’s retreat before what the mind itself has brought to light’ (p. 50).     
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Moreover, against suggestions to the contrary (O’Dwyer 2012, p. 173), 
Camus’s challenge to the automatic association and potential conflation of suicide 
with mental illness (and his radical repositioning of suicide within the context of the 
human, existential endeavour to make sense of life) does not entail that his work is 
unconcerned with the affective dimensions of suicide. The condition in which 
consciousness ‘awakens’ to the absurd, a condition in which the individual, 
attempting to make sense of life and its struggles, reaches the conclusion that life 
possesses no meaning that will enable them do so, is said to be characterised by a 
hopeless weariness, estrangement and dislocation (Camus 2000a, pp. 19-20, Young 
2005, p. 163). As Camus (2000a) makes clear: ‘A world that can be explained even 
with bad reasons is a familiar world. But, on the other hand, in a universe suddenly 
divested of illusions and lights, man feels an alien, a stranger. His exile is without 
remedy since he is deprived of the memory of a lost home or the hope of a promised 
land’ (p. 13). Therefore, to the extent that suicide is reconceptualized as a response to 
the absurd - a profoundly distressing condition of estrangement and alienation in 
which the individual is divested of hope of making sense of life’s struggles - Camus’s 
work not only challenges the framing of suicide within the context of mental illness, 
but it can also be understood as calling into question the sufficiency of the 
interventions that have traditionally been associated with an understanding of suicide 
within that context. That is, in challenging an understanding of suicidal ideation and 
behaviour as being symptomatic of a mental illness - and of cognitive distortions, 
irrationality and impulsivity in particular - Camus’s work also challenges the primacy 
and predominance that has traditionally been accorded to pharmacological 
interventions supported by the custodial and defensive practices of containment, 
seclusion, close observations and no-suicide contracts.  
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While a reconceptualization of suicide as a response to the absurd suggests 
that pharmacological interventions supported by custodial, defensive practices will 
have limited benefit in assisting an individual who is seeking to make sense of life 
and its struggles, it does not entail a rejection of the function that those practices may 
have, for example, in attempting to maintain and secure the physical integrity of an 
individual judged to be at risk. However, Camus’s work does suggest that such 
practices ought to be complimented by a more proactive, existentialist approach that 
acknowledges, and is able to meaningfully respond to, the profoundly challenging 
existential endeavour that the suicidal individual is undertaking (see, e.g. Yalom 1980, 
Frankl 2004, Roberts 2008, van Deurzen-Smith 2012, Cooper 2012, Langdridge 
2013). While a detailed discussion of such an existentialist approach is beyond the 
bounds of this paper, Camus’s work suggests that what is of central importance is 
facilitating the realisation that, although an individual may be unable to discern or 
maintain faith in a grand, overarching idea within which to situate life’s struggles, this 
ought not to lead to the conclusion, the specifically nihilistic conclusion, that life is 
without value and worth. Indeed, he makes it clear that The Myth of Sisyphus is a 
book which ‘declares that even within the limits of nihilism it is possible to find the 
means to proceed beyond nihilism’ (Camus 2000a, p. 7). In particular, his work 
suggests that even if an individual concludes that there is no overarching meaning that 
can serve as a context in which to situate, and make sense of, life’s various struggles, 
there exists an opportunity to engage in a collaborative exploration of what those 
struggles can come to mean in the unique context of that individual’s life, an 
opportunity to creatively respond to life’s challenges in a manner that enables the 
construction of a system of personal meaning that promotes new growth, development 
and direction in that individual’s life.     
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Conclusion 
Despite its complex and challenging tenor, it has been suggested that Camus’s work, 
and The Myth of Sisyphus in particular, can be productively employed to provide a 
radical and significant existentialist reconceptualization of suicide. By doing so, his 
work can be understood as calling into question the manner in which suicide has been 
framed within the context of mental illness, and within the context of irrationality in 
particular, as well as challenging the primacy and predominance given to 
pharmacological interventions and the custodial practices that are associated with an 
understanding of suicide within that context. While the literature indicates that 
pharmacological interventions and custodial practices continue to be the dominant 
form of mental health care for those individuals judged to be at risk of suicide (see, 
e.g. Cutcliffe & Barker 2002, Gilje et al. 2005, Cutcliffe & Stevenson 2008), there is 
a growing body of literature that suggests that this is changing. For example, in 
seeking to call into question traditional conceptualizations, associated attitudes and 
clinical interventions for those individuals judged to be at risk of suicide, 
contemporary suicidal behaviour management training programmes place increased 
emphasis on the ‘existential crisis’ associated with suicide and the employment of a 
broadly solution-focused approach to address such crisis (see, e.g. Gask et al. 2008, 
Henden 2009, Reeves 2013). Therefore, while not dismissing the clinical role that 
pharmacological interventions supported by custodial, defensive practices may have 
in responding to the individual judged to be at risk of suicide, Camus’s work can be 
understood as an exhortation for mental health professionals to continue to develop 
the skills to be able to acknowledge, discuss and meaningfully respond to the 
profoundly challenging existential aspects of suicide.  
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